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1 Introduction
The Seattle-Tacoma consumers have been paying higher prices for fresh milk
than consumers in other Western states of United States. For instance, the
retail price for whole milk averaged $3.27/gallon during the period of April
1999- April 2003 in Seattle-Tacoma, while it did not go beyond $2.86/gallon
in most of the large metropolitan areas in Western U.S, during the same pe-
riod (Carman and Sexton, 2006). In addition, retail prices in Seattle-Tacoma
do not respond similarly to farm price increases and decreases. Supermarkets
are prompt to pass on to consumers any increase in farm price, while they
do not pass or lag behind when farm price decreases.
Understanding the pricing conduct of the supermarket chains in Seattle-
Tacoma is a key issue toward explaining the level of ﬂuid milk retail prices as
well as the relationship between these prices and the farm price. A practical
question to answer is related to the level of power supermarket chains have
to set ﬂuid milk retail prices beyond the competitive level. More speciﬁcally,
do supermarket chains in Seattle-Tacoma exercise market power when they
set the ﬂuid milk retails prices? The objective of this article is, therefore, to
test for and measure the market power of supermarket chains in setting ﬂuid
milk prices in Seattle-Tacoma market area.
The present study attempts to analyze the pricing conduct of supermarket
2chains in a duopoly setting using a structural model of consumers and ﬁrms
behavior. Several studies have examined the pricing conduct in a duopoly
setting. These studies can be classiﬁed into two categories. In the ﬁrst cate-
gory, the focus is on providing a theoretical background for analyzing pricing
conduct by using game theoretic techniques to characterize the equilibrium1.
In the second category, the focus is on modeling the ﬁrms pricing conduct
by ﬁtting market data to the theoretical models. Often, the studies in this
category use observed data on sales and prices to infer the ﬁrms pricing
conduct, either through a conduct parameter approach (conjectural variation
studies) or through a menu approach. In the conjectural variation approach,
the focus is on estimating a conduct parameter that informs on the degree of
competition of the market or industry analyzed, and that nests the perfect
competition, the perfect collusion, and the Cournot/Bertrand models (e.g.,
Iwata, 1974; Gollop and Roberts, 1979, Appelbaum, 1982; Liang, 1989). In
the menu approach, a number of models based on strategic games played
by ﬁrms are estimated and compared to ﬁnd which game ﬁts the data more
consistently (e.g. Chintagunta and Jain (1995); Kadiyali et al. (1996); and
Dhar et al (2005)).
In this paper, we examine the pricing conduct of two supermarket chains
using retail supermarket-level data on sales and prices from Seattle-Tacoma
market area2. We follow the approach developed in Kadiyali et al. (1996)
1See for instance, Amir and Stepanova (2006); Ogawa and Kato (2006), and Christou
et al. (2007).
2We thank Ronald Cotterill, Director of Food Marketing Policy of the University of
3by comparing Bertrand-Nash pricing strategy against Stackelberg pricing
strategy, allowing for various leader-follower alternatives.
In Seattle-Tacoma, the supermarket industry is dominated by two su-
permarket chains: Albertsons’ and Safeway. The two supermarkets control
more than 61% of total grocery sales and more than 53% of the ﬂuid milk
sales. In addition, the private label represents more than 95% of the total
ﬂuid milk sold at these supermarket chains. This oﬀers a good case study of
a full vertically integrated duopolists.
In terms of pricing, the ﬁgure below indicates that the two supermarket
chains follow each other in setting the retail prices. In fact, using the four-
weekly data from Information Resources Incorporated-Infoscan (IRI) 3, the
partial correlation coeﬃcient between the retail prices in Albertsons’ and
the retail prices in Safeway was approximately 0.85, suggesting that the two
retailers follow each other in setting ﬂuid milk prices. On the other hand,
the spread between the retail prices and the farm price was widening and the
partial correlation coeﬃcient between retail prices in Safeway, for instance,
and farm price was only 0.29.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
develop a structural model of demand and supply for ﬂuid milk at the retail
level. The ﬂuid milk is assumed to be diﬀerentiated product. The diﬀeren-
tiation is made through the fat content and the supermarket diﬀerentiation
Connecticut, for allowing us to use this data.
3The data cover the period March 1996 through July 2000
4(supermarket chain, location,...). The alternative pricing games of Bertrand-
Nash and leader-follower are also described. In the third section, we describe
the data used and the empirical estimation issues. In section four, the results
and ﬁndings are presented. Section ﬁve concludes and present directions for
future research.
2 The Model
The two supermarket chains in our model, Albertsons (call it ﬁrm 1) and
Safeway (call if ﬁrm 2), each carry mainly two categories of ﬂuid milk: the
whole milk and the skimmed/low fat milk. These two categories are domi-
nated by the store brand, representing more than 95% of the ﬂuid milk sales.
Assuming a proﬁt-maximizing behavior for the two ﬁrms, each ﬁrm sets the
price to maximize the proﬁt given by
π1 = (p1 − MC1) ∗ M ∗ s1(p) + (p2 − MC2) ∗ M ∗ s2(p) (1)
π2 = (p3 − MC3) ∗ M ∗ s3(p) + (p4 − MC4) ∗ M ∗ s4(p) (2)
where the subscripts 1 and 2 designate the whole milk and the skimmed/low
fat milk sold at Albertsons supermarkets, respectively; and the subscripts 3
and 4 are reserved for the whole milk and the skimmed/low fat milk sold at
Safeway supermarkets, respectively. p1, p2, p3, and p4 are the retail prices of
the whole milk and the skimmed/low fat milk sold at Albertsons and Safeway
5stores, respectively. MC1, MC2, MC3, and MC4 are the corresponding
marginal costs associated with the production and the distribution of each
milk category at each supermarket chain. s1, s2, s3, and s4 are the market
shares, as function of the vector of prices p = (p1 p2 p3 p4)0. M is a measure
of the market size.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization for ﬁrm 1, assuming a
Bertrand-Nash game4 are given by
∂π1
∂p1
= s1 + (p1 − MC1)
∂s1(p)
∂p1






= s2 + (p1 − MC1)
∂s1(p)
∂p2




Similar ﬁrst order conditions can be obtained for ﬁrm 2.
∂π2
∂p3
= s3 + (p3 − MC3)
∂s3(p)
∂p3






= s4 + (p3 − MC3)
∂s3(p)
∂p4




Solving for the price-cost margins (pi − MCi) and putting the results in a






∂p1 = 0. Idem for the
other ﬁrst-order conditions.


















































































p1 − MC1 = −
η22s1−η21s2
−η12η21+η11η22
p2 − MC2 = −
η12s1−η11s2
η12η21−η11η22
p3 − MC3 = −
η44s3−η43s4
−η34η43+η33η44






∂pj, with i = 1,2,3,4 and j = 1,2,3,4.
Therefore, to estimate the price-cost margins under the Bertrand-Nash
game theoretical assumption, we only need to estimate the demand equa-
tions. Equation (7) gives the price-cost margins for each category of milk,
at each supermarket chain, as a function of the demand parameters and the
market shares. Notice that, the price-cost margins are estimated without
prior knowledge of the marginal cost.
In the Stackelberg game, we have a leader and a follower in the market.
In this game, the leader observes the best response of the follower and sets
the price that maximizes its proﬁt given the follower’s best responses. The
game is solved by backward induction to ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Assume for example that ﬁrm 1 (Albertsons supermarkets) is
7the leader in both the whole milk and the skimmed/low fat milk, and ﬁrm
2 (Safeway supermarkets) is the follower in both. Given that the game is




= s3 + (p3 − MC3)
∂s3(p)
∂p3






= s4 + (p3 − MC3)
∂s3(p)
∂p4




Solving for the price-cost margins we get
p3 − MC3 = −
η44s3−η43s4
−η34η43+η33η44




The leader sets the prices to maximize the proﬁt, given the follower’s best
responses. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the leader proﬁt maximization are
given by
∂π1
∂p1 = s1 + (p1 − MC1)[η11 + η1331 + η1441] + (p2 − MC2)[η21 + η2331 + η2441] = 0
∂π1





The ij’s could be obtained from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the follower
by diﬀerentiating the price-cost margins obtained in equation (11) with re-




∂p1 = 0. In other words, products produced by the same
ﬁrm do not react to each other.
























































































































∂p1 = 31 = −1
d[η44(η31 + η3331 + η3441) − η43(η41 + η4331 + η4441)]
∂p3
∂p2 = 32 = −1
d[η44(η32 + η3332 + η3442) − η43(η42 + η4332 + η4442)]
∂p4
∂p1 = 41 = 1
d[η34(η31 + η3331 + η3441) − η33(η41 + η4331 + η4441)]
∂p4
∂p2 = 42 = 1
d[η34(η32 + η3332 + η3442) − η33(η42 + η4332 + η4442)]
(14)
where d = η33η44 − η34η43
Regrouping the terms together, we can solve for the price reactions 31,
32, 41, and 42. Notice that these price reactions are functions of the de-
mand parameters, and are therefore easy to compute once the demand is
estimated6. These price reactions are used to solve for the price-cost margins
for the leader. These price-cost margins are given by
(p1 − MC1) = − b2s1−a2s2
−a2b1+a1b2
(p2 − MC2) = −b1s1−a1s2
a2b1−a1b2
(15)
6In the appendix we give the expression of these price reactions as function of the
parameters of the demand. Though their expressions look tedious, their values are easy
to compute.
9where a1 = η11 +η1331 +η1441, a2 = η21 +η2331 +η2441, b1 = η12 +η1332 +
η1442, and b2 = η22 + η2332 + η2442.
Equations (11) and (15) allow us to estimate the game where ﬁrm 1 leads
in both the whole milk and skimmed/low fat milk and ﬁrm 2 follows in both.
The price-cost margins of this game are obtained as a function of the demand
parameters.
The estimation of the games described above (Bertrand-Nash and Stack-
elberg games) relies heavily on the estimation the demand parameters. In
this study, we use a standard random coeﬃcients multinomial logit model7
to derive the demand for diﬀerentiated products8.
We assume that ﬂuid milk is diﬀerentiated across supermarkets. This
diﬀerentiation is the result of the diﬀerences between supermarket chains
in many dimensions: one-stop shopping convenience, promotional activities,
location, and the quality of the service oﬀered to shoppers. The consumer
chooses a supermarket chain from competing supermarkets in order to max-
imize utility, driven by the product and the store characteristics. The con-
sumer has also the possibility to shop from other store formats (the outside
option)9.
The indirect utility of consumer i from shopping for milk at supermarket
7For more on the random coeﬃcients multinomial logit applications, see Berry, Levin-
sohn, and Pakes (1995); Nevo (2000); Villas-Boas (2007); and Chidmi and Lopez (2007).
8Though the number of brands considered here is just 4, the use of the random coeﬃ-
cients multinomial logit model is justiﬁed for the consumers’ heterogeneity and the richer
pattern of substitution.
9The inclusion of the outside option is necessary to cover all the alternatives of the
discrete choice model. For a detailed discussion, see Train (2003).
10j10 is given by
Uij = αipj + βixj + εij i = 1,...,N j = 1,...,J (16)
where pj is the price of the ﬂuid milk sold at the supermarket j, xj is
a vector of observed product-supermarket chain characteristics, εij repre-
sents the distribution of consumer preferences about the unobserved product-
characteristics, with a density f(ε)11.The parameters to be estimated are αi
and βi. Note that these parameters are allowed to vary among consumers
and therefore take into account consumers as well as product heterogene-
ity. These coeﬃcients can be decomposed into a ﬁxed component, that does
not vary with the consumer characteristics; and a variable component that
changes with consumer characteristics. That is,
αi = α + λDi + γvi
βi = β + ϕDi + ρvi
(17)
where Di denotes consumer observed characteristics (i.e., income, age, house-
hold size, number of kids and so on), and vi denotes the unobserved consumer
characteristics, assumed to follow a standard normal distribution.
10We consider here the supermarket because in the case of Seattle-Tacoma market area,
more than 95% of the milk sold at the Albetsons and Safeway supermarkets is private
label.
11The unobserved characteristics are observed by the consumer but unobserved by the
econometrician).
11Substituting (17) into (16) yields
Uij = αpj + βxj + λDipj + γvipj + ϕDixj + ρvixj + εij (18)
The consumer chooses the product-supermarket that gives the highest
utility within his choice set. Aggregating over consumers in the market, the
market share of the jth product-supermarket corresponds to the probability
that the jth product-supermarket is chosen. That is,
sj =
Z
I {(Di,vi,εij) : Uij ≥ Uik ∀k = 0,1,...,J}dH(D)dG(v)dF(ε) (19)
where I is an indicator function that equals one when the expression be-
tween brackets is true and zero, otherwise. H, G, and F are the probability
distributions for the variables D, v, and ε, respectively.
We proceed as in Nevo (2000) to solve the integral in equation (18). The
partial derivatives of the market shares with respect to retail prices, used












123 Data and Methods
The methodology consists in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate a
consumer demand for ﬂuid milk at the product-supermarket level using a
random coeﬃcients multinomial logit model. In the second step, we use the
demand estimates to assess the market power of the supermarket chains using
a duopoly framework, and assuming a Nash Bertrand pricing conduct and
alternative Stackelberg pricing conducts.
For the demand estimation, we follow the algorithm developed by Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2000). The demand estimation de-
scribed above implies the need to use instrumental variables to account for
the potential endogeneity of the prices. This study follows Villas-Boas (2007)
and Chidmi and Lopez (2007) using instrumental variables constructed from
the interaction between product-supermarket dummies and input prices.
Hence, the farm milk price, the wages in Seattle-Tacoma retail industry, the
electricity prices and a packaging index were interacted with the product-
supermarket dummies.
The data used consist of two types of information: sales variables for
each product and demographic variables that provide information on con-
sumer heterogeneity. The sales data consist of scanner data from Informa-
tion Resource Inc., (IRI) at the brand supermarket level for Seattle-Tacoma,
provided by the food Policy Marketing Center of the University of Connecti-
cut. The data is a four-week periods between March 1996 and July 2000. It
13provides information, for each product-supermarket, on dollar sales, volume
sales, the percent of volume sold with any merchandising (promotion) and
the percent of price reduction. Using these data, we obtain the product-
supermarket market shares and the retail prices.
Data on product-supermarket characteristics include the product cate-
gory (whole milk versus skimmed/low fat milk), the store brand (private
label) dummy and the supermarket dummy. The demographic data were
obtained as random draw from the Current Population Survey for Seattle-
Tacoma. It consisted of two variables: the number of person under 16 years
and the household income.
Once the demand is estimated, the results are used to estimate the alter-
native games presented in the previous section. The results of this exercise
are presented in the following section.
4 Results
Demand Side
The parameter estimates of the random coeﬃcients multinomial logit given
by equation(19) are presented in Table 1. All the parameters in the mean
valuation utility are signiﬁcant. The parameter of the price, the price reduc-
tion variable, the private label dummy and the milk category dummy are
of expected sign. The negative sign of the promotion variable could be ex-
plained by the fact that promotion may have an eﬀect on the future sales but
14not the current sales. However, as the model takes into account consumers’
heterogeneity, the interpretation of the parameter estimates does not provide
full information as does the distribution of these parameter estimates across
consumers12.
Using equation (20), the matrix of price elasticities is computed and the
results are summarized in Table 2. As it can be see, all the elasticities are
of the expected sign. The own-price elasticities shows that the demand for
fresh milk at the product-supermarket level is elastic. These elasticities are
higher in Albertsons’ supermarket chain than in Safeway.
In terms of cross-price elasticities, ﬁrst note that within each supermarket
chain the cross price elasticities are low when compared to the own-price
elasticities. This attests that although consumers are sensitive to the prices
of their products-supermarket, they have developed a degree of brand loyalty.
Supply Side
Table 3 presents the Lerner index13 implied by each of the alternative game.
In this paper we present a Bertrand-Nash game, a Stackelberg game, where
Albertsons’ leads both in whole milk and skimmed/low fat milk and Safeway
follows in both; and a Stackelberg game where Safeway leads in both and
Albertsons’ follows in both.
The results shed light on the degree of market power the supermarket
chains in Seattle-Tacoma have to set the retail prices for milk. The results
12We will not present and discuss the distribution of the parameter estimates in this
draft.
13The Lerner index is given by L =
pi−MCi
pi .
15in Table 3 shows that all the alternative games estimated in this paper im-
ply some degree of market power exercised by the supermarket chains in
Seattle-Tacoma. The results are consistent with the theory as the Lerner
index implied by the Stackelberg game is higher than the one implied by the
Nash-Bertrand game14. Notice also that the margins are greater for Safe-
way supermarket chain than for Albertsons for both products and for all the
games. Also, supermarket chains make more money form the skimmed/low





14In this draft we do not test which model ﬁts the data better. This will be done in
future version.





Price reduction 1.1083 2.6967
Private label dummy (PLD) 2.0256 10.9739
Store dummy (SD) 1.7862 9.3496
Milk category dummy (MCD) -0.8249 -5.0494
Interactions
Income 0.1336 0.0832
Income x Price -0.8192 -2.3049
Income x PLD 0.7395 1.8098
Income x SD 1.4039 4.2999
Income x MCD 0.7836 2.5460
# of Kids -0.1934 -0.0017
# of Kids x Price -2.7055 -0.4676
# of Kids x PLD 0.0316 0.9259
# of Kids x SD 0.0306 3.5410
# of Kids x MCD 0.4997 0.3379
Unobserved 0.5858 1.2820
Unobserved. x Price -0.1581 -1.3488
Unobserved. x PLD 1.4369 2.5686
Unobserved. x SD 0.7627 1.0084



















































































































































































































































































































18Table 3: Lerner index (in %) for alternative games
Product-supermarket Bertrand-Nash Albertsons leads Safeway leads
Albertsons’ whole milk 18.95 21.22 18.95
Alberstons skimmed milk 41.72 44.92 41.72
Safeway whole milk 35.25 35.25 37.356
Safeway skimmed milk 63.89 63.89 66.57














































Albertsons Whole Milk Albertsons Skimmed Milk Farm Price
Safeway Whole Milk Safeway Skimmed Milk
20